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A snake presents the Garden of Eden to my mind. I am seduced in an external memory of my
history, an apple which shines beyond my immediate existence. “Don‟t think, you have wings”,
Death promises. It confesses in me, establishes in me the tranquility of the beyond. Supposedly
all the good return there.
My “consciousness suffers this [genetic] violence at its own hands: it spoils its own limited
satisfaction” (Phenomenology, 51). I never dreamt with my hands, being credited always to this
seductive voice. I want to read the story of the Fall against the violence of what vanishes in my
hands. Faced with death, this effort lies entirely in the realm of violence, of what can never be
written.
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Voicing Death
Through the history of thinking, or maybe since its fall into philosophy, Plato‟s notorious
definition of philosophy as the “study of death” is echoed. How then to learn and die?
Thought, through voices, grasping, nakedness, and memories, comes back to the tree of life and
reads again the fall of Adam and Eve in Genesis. These, supposed first humans, created ex
nihilo, the only ones to have lived in the absolute past of Eden are seduced by the voice of the
snake.
“For God knows that when you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be
like God, knowing good and evil” (Genesis, 3:5).
We will be setting aside the story and coming back to it, going through detours desired by this
delusion. The voice first, for which Hegel provides an insight of its pure taking-place. He
wonders about the absolute terror and thunder of the cry that the “ah” of death brings forth (LD,
48). Then, he stands in front of the most obvious, just for a moment: “every animal finds a voice
in its violent death; it expresses itself as a removed self” (LD, 45).
For Hegel, “the death of the animal is the becoming of consciousness” (Death, Hegel, Sacrifice,
9). The voice is thus the consciousness of contradiction, the splitting of the subject (LD, 45). It is
active hearing for the animal, insofar as in surpassing itself by calling out, it returns into itself.
Voice, announcing death even if it not the final cry after which it is modeled, is the expression of
the removed self, of an absence. Exiled from this garden, still seeking a fugitive place, we are
concerned with this fall into absence.
Adam and Eve listen to the snake‟s voice. By being heard, the snake becomes its own phantasm,
the listened I which exists only through the other. Soon after having listened, the entire Garden
2
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will flee in Adam and Eve‟s memory, where the snake will abides in its ownmost by vanishing
(Phenomenology, 308). The devil of seduction gets eternalized in the symbol which it is. The
snake is then not only the other of God which seduces, or rather insofar as it this other, the snake
is the passage into the mythopoetic act (the birth) of thinking. What is the snake but a Socrates,
as the student of death, the other of God, the seductor and corruptor of the youth, plunged into
the nothingness of a pure thinking symbol with no hands? The devil never writes. For Heidegger
listening (hören) is always thought on the basis of a belonging (gehören).
“Listening-to is Dasein‟s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. (…)
As a Being in the world with others, a Being which understands, Dasein is „in thrall‟ to
Dasein-with and to itself; and in this „thralldom‟ it belongs to these” (BT, 206).
Listening to this call, Eve tastes the apple‟s temptation. Adam follows suit. Of course, the apple
is death, and by eating it they internalize it and belong to it. “The internalization of man: thus it
was that man developed what was later called his „soul‟” (Genealogy, 84). Soul, as the atemporal
source from which this temporal experience of death before death springs, an experience which
can only happen because of temporality, our ability to be ahead of ourselves and at the same time
tracing ourselves, to relate to the future and the past, on the basis of soul‟s eternity. Listening the
voice “opens the eyes” to the knowledge of “good and evil”, taken up and internalized in the
watchfulness of conscience.
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Memories of Guilt
In the manual that aspires to the death of Genesis, to its impossible forgetting, in the Genealogy
of Morals, Nietzsche follows these exact moments. The first book is titled “‟Good and Evil‟,
„Good and Bad‟“. The second book is titled “„Guilt‟, „Bad Conscience‟, and the Like”.

The rational animal, the political animal, is thought in this essay as the animal that promises.
Nietzsche‟s synthesis: the promise is a logos coupled with a political contract. Nature set the task
to “breed” this animal with “the right to make promises” (Genealogy, 57). The promise,
introduced by the time of the future, and what is already past in the future, is a mechanism that
represses the act of forgetting (Genealogy, 57). The promise represses these forgetful “doors”
that shut themselves in the tremor of the potential, the impossible, totality, truth, and the beyond.
Repression returns on itself: remember. The doors open. The liberation granted by the first
repression of forgetting, the dyspeptic compulsion to purge any other repression, gets repressed.
The promise is the instrument of this “mnemotechnics” that facilitates the “memory of the will”
(Genealogy, 58). It inflicts pain, its punishment, in order to obstruct the vomiting of forgetfulness
(how well it knows of silence) by introducing a lack that traverses time, and which lack requires
to be filled, as if it needs to be healed. The human is painfully bred by the human, by the
human‟s own nature, by the remembrance of the promise. A politics of pain? Yes, since the
founding of a people and their conscience is based on sacrifice.
“If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never
ceases to hurt stays in the memory” (Genealogy, 61).
Memory is brought about by the question of the economy of the moment, the investment in it,
the necessity of discounting and producing. Through mnemotechnics passes then a proto4
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economy. The sacrifice as the founding of the authority must be paid back by subjugation. “The
pain of the culprit”, the traitor, having injured the master by not paying back the latter‟s,
phantomatic, sacrifice can only get exchanged by the split sacrifice of that culprit, when that pain
founds and partakes in “the right of the masters” (Genealogy, 65). This debt weighs on in the
remembrance of guilt.

Guilt demands debt to be paid back. Nietzsche utilized here the German Schuld which means
both guilt and debt (Genealogy, 63). The master enjoys this pain of subjugation because of the
recognition of his superiority. We are still at the rupture of guilt, where we are searching for
clothes.

The Refuge of Nakedness
“Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked” (Genesis,
3:7)
Insofar as the first reflective act of conscience realizes the subject‟s nakedness, we get
summoned to guilt. The phone rings. “It‟s the creditors” (Undercommons, 62).

In fact,

immediately after Adam and Eve have eaten the apple, God calls in, he comes to search for them,
and Adam and Eve, like fugitives, hide afraid of their nakedness (Genesis, 3:10).
The God, credit, that sees everything, finds them and asks, “Who told you that you were naked?”
(Genesis, 3:11). “Credit keeps track”, while “debt forgets. You‟re not home, you‟re not you, you
moved without a forwarding address called refuge” (Undercommons, 62). It was credit that
placed the seducer in the form of the snake to ask for the debt of desire to be paid. “Bad debt is
senseless, which is to say it cannot be perceived by the senses of capital” (Undercommons, 66).
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Good and evil, the dichotomy that adds sense, seduce the creatures of God into transgressing His
word.
Adam and Eve are “told” they are naked. Nakedness is this state of shame in being oneself,
because one is not oneself. In nakedness I face who I am, through who I am not. I look at
myself. The significance of this process lies in the fact that the beginning is already a fall, a
being lost. Jean Hyppolite writes that “for Hegel self-formation is only conceivable through the
mediation of alienation or estrangement” (LoS, 285). Alienation is the refuge of bad debt.
“Excessive debt, incalculable debt, debt for no reason, debt broken from credit, debt as its own
principle”, running “in every direction”, “scattered”, “escaping” (Undercommons, 61). From the
very beginning, or rather before the beginning, the beginning is when I am lost, a stranger to
myself, naked. So, we begin…
Midnight Hands
“He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat,
and live forever” (Genesis, 3:23)
The grasping of the apple is performed by the hand, and Eve hands it over to Adam. Clothing is
the first act after the opening of the eyes in conscience: “So they sewed fig leaves together and
made coverings for themselves” (Genesis, 3:7).
We must follow these moments of the hand because it is what liberates and enslaves. The hand
fights, it heals, and it shields peace (εκετειρία/truce). The “liberation of the hand as what is
proper to man” (B&S, 182), writes Derrida, echoing an irreducible legacy bringing together, to
say the very least, Marx and Heidegger. Our guiding question then is precisely this, concerning
the hand, in virtue of the eternal question of servitude and mastery, of what gives rise to both,
6
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and in virtue of propriety and alterity. The question, if we can call it the question, is not who
speaks, whose voice this is. I can remain silent, I can cancel myself, I can say too many things. It
wouldn‟t matter, there is nothing to be said.
The fall into alienation is concretized in the hand, the hand which is paralyzed in public, in
which I throw my eyes oedipally when I no longer want to see, the hand‟s reach which would be
my home. The same hand though that they “taught me” (they first taught me about the hand, how
to use and thus “respect”, not to grab the apple). The hand prohibited movements and objects (I
remember how they forbade me to touch history and “art”, they directed its touch, they were
always threatened by it). The hand that I had to wash (that has to always be washed before and
after the sacrifice), that same hand that Pontius Pilate washed in declaring his innocence for the
blood of Christ, for which “you shall see” (“λαβὼν ὕδυπ ἀπενίταηο ηὰρ σεῖπαρ ἀπένανηι ηοῦ
ὄσλος, λέγυν, Ἀθῷόρ εἰμι ἀπὸ ηοῦ αἵμαηορ ηούηος· ὑμεῖρ ὄτεζθε”) (Mathew, 27:24). The hand of
an other that has built in unison a world carved in a memory and thrust upon me from the dead.
The hand of belief whose touching is all (remember the doubt of Thomas). The hand that is rent
out to systems and machines, that is and is not granted a sign or a name, and has done so forever
in the name of so many gods, as in the hand that the judge pounds. Handcuffs…
Where is the hand with which I would relate to my friend, the hand that in freedom would belong
to an impossible lover, the hand which is only yours, the hand which empties and bends last?
The hand that prays, somehow. The hand is the vehicle of my beyond. It is where the „I‟ and the
not-„I‟, my essence and eccentricity, my inside and outside, merge.
“O my brother blind clock hands we climb towards midnight” (Trakl, poem Decline).
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Yesterday‟s Hands
“Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away according to necessity
(τρεών); for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the
ordinance of time.” (Anaximander, 576)
This is the oldest fragment of western thought, translated by Nietzsche. Derrida, on his essay on
Heidegger‟s hand, insists on Heidegger‟s treatment of τρεών. Heidegger says that in τρεών
speaks the hand (τείρ). But for Heidegger it is the hand which orders the need, and thinks of the
idea of constraint and debt (τρέος) (Anaximander, 619) as a secondary aspect of necessity. What
is before necessity, thought juridically, is that “I get involved with something, I reach for it,
extend my hand to it” (Anaximander, 619). Hofmann will admit that it is possible, yet not
certain, that the τρεών is related to the proto-indo-european gher-, which refers to grasping and
the hand (Hofmann, 502): thus habit, habitat (to dwell), and habitus (Latin for clothes).
Χρεών is related to temporality via the Indo-European ghr-onos, the root being again the gher-,
which in Greek becomes τρόνος. The receiving of the debt of time: heritage. Interestingly, in the
Indo-European languages, the heir and the orphan are closely linked. The Latin root „hered-„ is
linked to the Greek τηροζηής (collateral heir) and also to τήρος (deprived of a parent, the parent
sacrificed) (I-E Lang. and Soc., 68).
“In Homeric Greek, kherostes is the member of the family who inherits in default of
children, he is the relative who receives a property which has become „abandoned‟” (IE Lang. and Soc., 68).
The kherostes inherits the sacrifice. The receiving of heritage is then historically also founded on
the idea of an abandoned „property‟, the tree abandoned to the snake, the devil whose fertility is
barred. This property one receives not from one‟s parents, not biologically, but from the external
8
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realm of the world, to which one owes, and from which one is found guilty. The orphan, naked
and fugitive, is credited by this sacrifice. “In Indo-European (…) heirs were only those who
inherited in default of a son” (I-E Lang. and Soc., 68). Heirs receive this abandoned call and are
indebted to it.
This is a religious discourse, but also a discourse of religion on religion. Religion needs the autofoundation in order to find itself and faith is necessary after the fall. Πηώζις, the Greek term for
the fall, is etymologically linked to the ancient Indian word patman, which also means a flight, a
path, and hence the Greek word for flight, πηήζις, will reasonably be phonetically connected to
πηώζις (Hofmann, 327). Hegel will thus write in the Phenomenology of Spirit that “faith, in so
far as faith is a flight from the actual world, is [thus] not a self-complete experience” (PhS, 297).
Only after being expelled from Eden can faith begin as a reality, in a world created but left with
no parent/master. Then, Adam and Eve are damned to the mortal and subjugating cultivation of
the soil (culture) (Genesis, 3:18). The soil of the abandoned property must be worked on, must
be cultured. Faith and technique, disparate and non-separate, become thus the pharmaka of a
being which has broken away from its own nature.
What is significant given the voice‟s work is that this supplementarity of faith, its guilty
technique, is not only a non-experience, being as it is a-temporal and springing from an absolute
past, but the experiential rendering of non-experience. Encountering in experience this nonexperience is the incompleteness of our existence and hence the possibility of transcendence. The
lack to which we owe.
This lack is inserted in time via technology. Technology, as chronothetic, is always a process of
presencing and absenting, since such is the passage of time. Our own techno-logical mastery
9
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over the world, to which we enslaves ourselves, begins in this double process of being
abandoned by (forgetting) and resisting (remembering) the master, as death or as God. Thus, the
Freudian child‟s technical game of the presencing and absencing of the toy occurs at the time
when the child stops protesting the departure of his mother/master (BPP, 600). The child, in a
dialectical fashion, “revenges [itself] on a substitute” (BPP, 601). Conscience arose from the
voice of the animal‟s death, but its sealing, its insistence and its history, is the history of faith, the
indebted hand‟s memory.
Finitude and Excess
This master‟s abandoning of property is translated in our need for a substitute/support. The
human animal, as the animal of the loss, is thus techno-logical. An animal guilty of the promise?
For conscience‟s gaze, its metrics, we are not sufficient to ourselves, we are naked. “The
inscription of elementary supplementarity in the empirical is originary” (Derrida and
Technology, 254). For Stiegler, the origin of technics, of supplementarity, is found in the form of
the origin of mortality (TT, 16). Techno-logy hence as “thanatology”, from which the protoIndo-European stem tek-, of techne, is related to the debt via the Greek ηόκος (interest, the
penalty of debt) (Pokorny, 3058). The technical world reverberates the sacrificed parent, from
whom I am abandoned, whose credit cannot be appropriated.
This call of credit comes “from beyond and over me” (BT, 320). Beyond me, as the master? But
then who is the master in me? “Man”, writes Heidegger, "is also master and servant of the world
in the sense of „having‟ world" (Animal, 153). We are dealing thus with the possession of an
abandoned world. We are in yet also stand against the world, and thus we can „have‟ world, we
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can form world. Or is the world lost? We are both master and slave, lacking from and exceeding
ourselves in finitude.
We shall insist on consciousness and not on conscience here, assuming this distinction lies in the
latter‟s being supplemented with guilt, as we attempt to approach the question of technology
through memory. Derrida breaks up on itself Husserl‟s distinction between a being-in-the-now
(primary retention), as it slips past, and a re-collection of that now (secondary retention).
“The presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is
continuously compounded with nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory
and expectation” (Derrida and Technology, 242).
It is not that there are not vast differences between primary and secondary retentions, but more
so, that the opposition cannot sustain what Husserl wanted it to, namely the distinction of
immediate perception (which would be the primary retention) from representation or recollection
(the secondary retention). I always remember a moment, and I remember in the moment. The
totality of the primary retention, which I forget, includes memory and its forgetting. For Derrida
it is a difference between two modes of nonperception (Derrida and Technology, 243).
So, the distinction proved inadequate even in Husserl‟s later thinking, as he would revise his
distinction, only though to hint at what Stiegler calls “tertiary retentions” (Theater of
Individuation, 46). These tertiary retentions, the objects which make possible re-collection but
also a certain kind of transmission, are the products of technique and of signs (Derrida and
Technology, 249), depending on the logic of instrumentality and support. Insofar then as these
thanatological supports are “always already there”, the attack on the present‟s privilege is
justified by the compounding of the “living of consciousness, given its retentionally finite
structure, (…) with the dead” (Derrida and Technology, 245).
11
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Through absence we face our “retentional finitude” (Derrida and Technology, 247). The need for
the supplement, as the tertiary retention, comes from finitude and its support is its own essence
transfigured, or, the cry of death inscribed in external memory. Yet, the inscription fades, it
effaces itself, as the whole or even the essence of tertiary retentions lies beyond our finite
capacity and consequently authorizes manipulation and guidance. This is the structural axiomatic
we want to insist on as it points to the necessity of forgetting and remembering, of the selection
and exclusion of paths, and of being-lost. That we remember, and that we have forgotten, is
evidence of exceeding ourselves as subjects. The „I‟ includes its being-lost.
Still, this exceeding, already there, can only be retroactively constituted (Derrida and
Technology, 259) by the supplement. For example for science to progress, the technological
reserve must enable the storage of collective memory so that scientists can pick up this work in
developing scientific principles, assumptions, and deadlocks. Work need not be done always
from the beginning, even if science is obsessed with a beginning it cannot grant itself. Unless it
views itself as technology. And a similar process is at work in the realm of habits, behaviors, and
values in which we catch ourselves. Not merely an opening to objects of cognition then, but also
to the constancy of others, which the objects also inaugurate. These objects are the primary way
into the memory hold, the memory of others, to which we are given. Memory and technics are
indissoluble (Derrida and Technology, 249).
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The Shifts of the Origin
If through the memory in tertiary retentions we remember the past, thought naturally inquires
into the origin. This is thought‟s resistance to itself, its dream of a natural way. This is the
thinking of destiny, a hermeneutics, in which Hermes, the messenger of the gods and of human
history, surfaces. Precisely this we must not, simply, do. For Derrida,
“it is crucial for the temporality of an immanent lived experience to be the absolute
beginning of the appearance of time [for it to be an uncontaminated primary memory],
and yet it only appears to itself as an absolute beginning thanks to a “retention” [which
is chronothetic]; it only inaugurates within tradition; it creates precisely because it has
a historical heritage. It seems illegitimate, then, to exclude from the beginning of
reflection all temporal transcendence and any constituted unity of time”. (Derrida and
Technology, 245)
To think of an originary experience or phenomenon, a consciousness, preceding technique is
inconceivable. “It is impossible to dissociate anthropogenesis from technogenesis” (Derrida and
Technology, 258). The origin, even of this supposed experience speaking now, cannot be
thought, but it cannot remain completely exterior to thought either. It concerns us fully; it is
already there as an instinctive insistence.
“This impossibility of reanimating absolutely the manifest evidence of an originary
presence refers us therefore to an absolute past. That is what authorized us to call trace
that which does not let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present. If the trace
refers to an absolute past, it is because it obliges us to think a past that can no longer
be understood in the form of a modified presence, as a present-past” (Derrida and
Technology, 255).
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This past, Eden, we are always searching for. Destiny though can never be lived and
experienced, we have fallen from it and can now experience the non-experience of faith. Such
memory cannot be our own and so mnemotechnics can never be dissociated from an irretrievable
absence and loss, a nostalgia, the home-sickness of alienation.

To this nostalgia Nietzsche feels repulsion. A grand technician, he longs to forget what is forced
on us from an origin that must not tame us. His appeal to thinking is for it to get attuned to the
semi-transcendental structure of the technic. The absolute past pollutes and falls into history.
Then history becomes an exercise on the becoming of this never of the a priori. What escapes,
the essence, if we can speak of one, only partially determines its reorderings. We want to inhabit
this genealogical limit, which perceives
“how in each individual case the elements of the synthesis undergo a shift in value and
rearrange themselves accordingly. So that now this, now that element comes to the fore
and dominates at the expense of the others; and under certain circumstances one
element (the purpose of deterrence perhaps) appears to overcome all the remaining
elements” (Genealogy, 80).
Our thinking here is already chained by history, even though it seems as if we have been evoking
a transcendental structure. This struggle, now, is also the technical struggle of a hermeneutics of
hermeneia (interpretation), of destiny‟s destiny.
“This double movement of abstraction and attraction that both tears away from and
attaches back to the land, to the idiom, to the literal, to everything that is somewhat
unclearly brought together under the name of „identity‟” (Derrida and Technology, 260)

14
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Of Chains and Cords
“[Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away] along the lines of
usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting)
of disorder.” (Anaximander, 625, this now is Heidegger‟s translation)
If attracted and abstracted, I could be torn away and attached mortally. I would stand on both
sides. The point is that I cannot stand; I must flee my own position. This is the “necessity of the
resolution contained in the solitude that the singularity of Dasein necessarily is” (Theater of
Individuation, 49). Angst‟s foundation demands never to be put aside. In society though, one has
to stand in-line. One must enter the realm of an illegitimate determination, as flights cannot be
publicized. The fall from the horizon of my beyond occurs because this beyond in not relatable.
The realm of “publicness” “proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get
interpreted, and it (i.e. publicness) is always right.” (Theater of Individuation, 52)
There, “I am in the realm of regression” (Theater of Individuation, 50). Angered at this
regression Heidegger embarks in his seminar World, Finitude, Solitude to awaken a fundamental
attunement “by letting what is asleep become wakeful” (Animal, 147). We can here think of
sleep, not as unconsciousness, but as “a δεζμός, a being bound, a peculiar way in which aesthesis
is bound” (Animal, 149). Who doubts that we are so often asleep in today‟s technological
frenzy? That the monsters are sleeping, remembered in someone else‟s dreams. The “they” offers
this “tranquility, for which everything is „in the best order‟ and all doors are open” (BT, 222).
And yet, this tranquility, possessed by a feeling that it “possesses everything, or that everything
is within its reach”, becomes a movement of “turbulence” that leads to one “getting entangled” in
oneself (BT, 223). “Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting” (BT, 221).

The form of the

question is one of a transformation as an “awakening” into an attunement.
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In the realm of regression, we are not allowed to “let be”, to flee from ourselves, and the public
projects a “relation of utility, of putting-in-perspective” (Animal, 159). Yet, would an awakening
into a letting-be, far from the constant putting-in-perspective, be possible? Arendtian politics
sought an impossible exemplariness as an ethical ideal that could guide politics and shape
history. There are too few examples though, if any. And how could we ever be released from a
mode which we seek to withdraw ourselves, but whose release would be obliged to repeat the
principles of this modality of utility and perspective (Animal, 160). It is better to get out, isn‟t it?
This letting-be and the relation of utility is a restatement of the question of the absolute past and
its impossible necessity, of attachment and being-torn. A nostalgia, too, of the political, which
Arendt mourns as she sees it fall into the social, the privatized world of labor.
Maybe the answer could be found within nostalgia insofar as it pertains by way of death and
absence (Animal, 160). Would nostalgia thrust aside utility and perspective, if this possibility
occurs in friendship, when friends bear one another in absence and distance, even in death?
Maybe though the question of the structural fall within techno-logy, in the conflict of the snake
and the hand, can only be accessed and surpassed via technology, through its auto-immunity, the
way it seeks its own auto-destruction. The hand which wounds is the hand which heals, notes
Hegel concerning the Fall (Encyclopaedia, §24).

The political, insofar as it remains essential, question of technology is animated by the fact that a
supplement always points to an environment and an environment is always supported by others.
Our being-with, unable to be pure and proper, brings about a „distantiality‟.
“In one‟s concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or against, the
others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that
difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one‟s own Dasein has lagged
16
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behind the others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one‟s
Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed.
“But this distantiality which belongs to being-with, implies that Dasein, as everyday
being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to others. It itself is not; its being has been
taken away by the others. Dasein‟s everyday possibilities of being are for the others to
dispose of as they please.” (BT, 163-4)
This is not some arbitrary occurrence of our “nature”. The inescapable structure of tertiary
retentions is both based on and founding of this disposition. Our relation to others is mediated,
accessed only through these supports. We are caught not only mid-way but also within the world,
through our roles, duties, laws, relatives. The very concept of a ground, which our tension to
attach commands, is grounded in others. We receive our own possibilities and their own
prescribed limitations.
“In this averageness with which it [publicness] prescribes what can and may be
ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every
kind of priority gets silently suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets
glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a
struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This
care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the
„levelling down‟ of all possibilities of being.” (BT, 165)
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Clothed Creatures
“ 'I will destroy this temple made with human hands and in three days will build
another, not made with hands.' " (Mark 14:58)
The insights read in Genesis concerning alienation originate from the principle of creation. The
human creature is created by God in His own image. The creature, God‟s technical puppet, wants
to transgress its role, to betray its master. Consequently, it can be seduced if promised equality
with the role of the creator. No wonder it ends up, after the creature‟s actual taking of the role,
being precisely this prohibition, only more damned and weakened.
“In the Old Testament, there is a sort of jealousy of Yahweh toward the creature. And
we say that transgresses the creature” (Save the Technical Object).
We can see this, for example in Paul, who in the second Corinthians, section 5 titled Our
Eternal Dwelling, writes
“For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from
God, an eternal house in heaven, not built by human hands. Meanwhile we groan,
longing to be clothed instead with our heavenly dwelling, because when we are clothed,
we will not be found naked. For while we are in this tent, we groan and are burdened,
because we do not wish to be unclothed but to be clothed instead with our heavenly
dwelling, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life”. (2 Corinthians 5)
Mortals must be clothed with the eternal, covering the nakedness of the passing of time. What
flees has no existence and faith brings this flight into our horizon by associating it with the
dwelling place of the eternal, the divine. We thus hide in front of the gaze of this law that
requires of us to wear clothes. Derrida insists on thinking “shame and technicity together”
(Animal, 5). Paul‟s letter expresses this lack in finitude, this finite and shameful lack that must
be clothed with the purity of a divine dwelling.
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To this Simondon responds:
“But is not all creation a transgression? I think transgression, whose origin is the
serpent, is the creation of a person. If Adam and Eve never left the Garden of Eden they
would have not become human beings or inventors. Their one son was a shepherd, the
other a farmer. Techniques were born there. Finally, technics and transgression seem
to be the same” (Save the Technical Object).
For Paul the transgression must only be a temptation, a false departure that permits a return to the
word of God, who granted freedom only so that we can learn to obey. On the other hand,
Nietzsche revels in nakedness and the daring to grasp beyond ourselves. Of course, this treatment
of transgression is reflected in its necessary aftermath: debt and punishment. Nietzsche uncovers
these histories and finds the elements that resound to his sense of joy.

In terms of debt and in the place of the Judeo-Christian "I ought not to have done that" of
sovereignty and guilt, Nietzsche desires the autonomous basis of a "here something has
unexpectedly gone wrong" (Genealogy, 83). Not guilt but sadness, a sadness whose
responsibility lies in the effort of overcoming, not in the obedience to an old promise handed
over. His fear is that one‟s life creation might be treated by others‟ hands, or, more so by the
other of a hand, by a faceless voice that can judge and punish. Punishment is reduced to
consciousness, “our weakest and most fallible organ!” (Genealogy, 84).
“Thus punishment tames men, but it does not make them "better"-one might with more
justice assert the opposite” (Genealogy, 83).
The punishment of Prometheus is telling. Prometheus brings fire to mankind, but this is the fire
of techne, not of a Holy Spirit. Prometheus thus says in a dialogue with the Chorus,
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“I took from man expectancy of death. (…)
I planted blind hope in the heart of him. (…)
Moreover, I conferred the gift of fire. (…)
Yea, and shall master many arts thereby.” (…) (Prometheus Bound)
A whole other salvation. No “blind hope” instilled in followers. Prometheus is punished by Zeus
and his bandits for stealing fire from their world. Yet, the punishment only adds to Prometheus‟
pride and sadness, to his sense of duty in autonomy. Prometheus brings the divine, a blind fiery
hope, into life. The betrayal of the Law by love is joyful and sad but not sinful.
“Behold what I, a God, from Gods endure!
Look down upon my shame,
The cruel wrong that racks my frame,
The grinding anguish that shall waste my strength“ (Prometheus Bound).
Politics of Pain
Already the traversal of guilt, debt, and mnemotechniques has been too vast and too fast. We
would need to stop and stare, and yet the debt of time that weighs on this study wants to go all
around. We‟ll end with a final note on today‟s state of debt. Debt is today‟s master signifier. As
our governments owe to one another, debt orders the international scene. Lending related to the
Greek „λείπω‟, absence, which means “to be in a deficient state”, “to be missing from the
environment where one ought to be” (I-E Lang. and Soc., 151). The loans of credit can be given
without one‟s consent, they weigh on the people that were never there when they were given out.
Functioning as a medicine for the subject‟s retentional finitude, money measures all tertiary
retentions. The retentions disclosing a world go forgotten. A sign is given. The forgetting of the
support kills the possible transgression through technics. “Don‟t mourn, you‟re in debt, get over
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it”. Memory focuses on credit, on its private stories, on the debt of our parents and on that very
debt owed to them. “We‟re all your parents”, they say.
Their punishments which don‟t even promise liberation, render us calculable subjects.
“Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his
own image of himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own future”
(Genealogy, 58).
An advanced technique of promise, the perfect illusion of a promised stability, for the animal of
the loss, the animal that is lost. The promisory note is on fire. It can set everything aflame and
blind hope itself. They know it, these moralists that tame, that “without cruelty there is no
festival” (Genealogy, 67). We get punished with so much more than guilt. But they don‟t want us
to be sad.
“Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging-- these
preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain sense
they constitute thinking as such” (Genealogy, 70).
Isn‟t this still the case? Only that today‟s financial system functions through temporality, as a
memory-system of exchanges. Today‟s economy is completely dependent on registering, tracing,
making sure that everything can be remembered. Price is not merely then the conveyor of
information, as liberalism would have it. This is the thinking of an empty tradition, of the empty
tradition as being empty, as he forgets everything the market carves in external memory. The
insistence on the present signal and tendency of prices stresses the way in which information is
conveyed, but what a selective memory, only of the absolutely new.
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This memory might manage to order the absent subjects of credit. The slave might thank the
master, depending on and rejoicing with the master, but this is caused by the horrific threat of the
Law which lies beyond choice.

We, the fire of a past no one remembers, we promise again to fall naked in a prideful awakening.
We owe them, those that are inside us, nothing but our season in hell, the bitter fruit of revenge
that forgets them. If we could only raise the question of a new economy through a new
mnemotechnological relation to the world…
“Once, if I remember rightly, my life was a feast where all hearts opened, and all wines
flowed.
One evening I sat Beauty on my knees – And I found her bitter – And I reviled her.
I armed myself against Justice.
I fled. O sorceresses, O misery, O hatred, it was to you my treasure was entrusted!
I managed to erase all human hope from my mind. I made the wild beast‟s silent leap to
strangle every joy.” (A Season in Hell, Prologue)
Credit spreads untouchable. It is the consciousness that doesn‟t stop demanding. Our ideals
created by hands owe it to a voice that declares the guilt of our nakedness. Don‟t have faith in
that! Flee with the non-memory of the absolute past that you so painfully forget. Betray for that
infinite debt in your hands, the sublime debt located wherever your hands reach, in all you create
and caress, and to which you give your life. This debt you will only hand to your death, the death
we cannot expect.

The incalculable promise on our side is not to wear the ghostly attire of the Law. They do not
want us to fall. They want us to fear their promises, these masters who are still in the Garden of
Eve, sleeping in an inert festivity of long broken promises. Transgression, even in memory, is a
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delusion for them. Therefore the apple that would turn debt around is supposedly placed beyond
anyone‟s reach. What a museum this is, a temple forgetting that the promise lies open. Don‟t
wear the ghastly attire of the Law. The guards, professing their understanding, murder your fall.

23

2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship,
Final Paper, May 2014
Antonios Cotzias, SAS – 2015, University of Pennsylvania

References
1. Aeschylus. "Prometheus Bound." The Internet Classics Archive. MIT. Web. 12 Mar.
2014.
2. Agamben, Giorgio. Language and Death. Trans. Michael Hardt and Karen E. Pinkus.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1991. Print. (in-text reference, LD)
3. Bataille, Georges. "Hegel, Death, Sacrifice." Trans. Jonathan Strauss. Yale French
Studies78. On Bataille (1990): 9-28. JSTOR. Web. 02 Feb. 2014.
4. Benveniste,

mile. Indo-European Language and Society. Trans. Jean Lallot. Coral

Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1973. Print. (in text: I-E Lang. and Soc.)
5. "Bible

Gateway." Bible

Gateway.

Web.

15

Feb.

2014.

http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis%203&version=NIV

(in-text:

Genesis)
6. Derrida, Jacques. The Beast and the Sovereign. Ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet,
and Ginette Michaud. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington. Vol. II. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago, 2011. Print. (in-text reference, B&S)
7. Freud, Sigmund. "Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)." The Freud Reader. ed. Peter
Gay. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989. 594-628. Print. (in-text reference, BPP)
8. Hegel, Logic. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part I, trans. William
Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1892, §24 (The Fall of Man).
9. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. Arnold V. Miller. Ed.
J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon, 1977. Print.
10. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie, and Edward Robinson.
Seventh ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Print. (in-text reference, BT)

24

2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship,
Final Paper, May 2014
Antonios Cotzias, SAS – 2015, University of Pennsylvania

11. Heidegger, Martin. The Anaximander Fragment. Trans. David Farrel Krell. Arion: A
Journal of Humanities and the Classics. vol. 1, No. 4, 1973-4, pp. 576-626. Online.
12. Hofmann, J. B. Εηςμολογικόν Λεξικόν ηηρ Απσαίαρ Ελληνικήρ. Trans. Ανηωνίοσ Δ.
Παπανικολάοσ. Athens: Absens, 1974. Print.
13. Lacan, Jacques. The Language of the Self; The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis.
Trans. Anthony Wilden. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968. Print. (in-text reference, LoS)
14. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans.
Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967. Print.
15. Pokorny, Julius. Proto-Indo-European Etymological Dictionary. Ed. A. Lubotsky and
George Starostin. Moscow: DNGHU, 2007. Revised Edition of J. Pokorny's
Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. PDF.
16. Rimbaud, Arthur. "Rimbaud: A Season in Hell." Poetry in Translation. A. S. Kline, n.d. Web. 18
Mar. 2014.

17. Simondon, Gilbert. "SAVE THE TECHNICAL OBJECT: Interview with Gilbert
Simondon

(1983)."

Interview

by

Anita

Kechickian,

translated

by

Andrew

Iliadis. Philosophy of Information & Communication. N.p., 06 Mar. 2013. Web. 12 Mar.
2014. <http://philosophyofinformationandcommunication.wordpress.com/2013/03/06/isnot-all-creation-a-transgression-gilbert-simondon-interview-1989-save-the-technicalobject/>.
18. Stiegler, Bernard. "Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and
the Prosthesis of Faith." Trans. Richard Beardsworth. Jacques Derrida and the
Humanities: A Critical Reader. Ed. Tom Cohen. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 2001.
238-63. Print.

25

2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship,
Final Paper, May 2014
Antonios Cotzias, SAS – 2015, University of Pennsylvania

19. Stiegler, Bernard. "THE THEATER OF INDIVIDUATION: PHASE-SHIFT AND
RESOLUTION

IN

SIMONDON

AND

HEIDEGGER."

Trans.

Kristina

Lebedeva.Parrhesia Special Issue on the Work of Gilbert Simondon 7 (2009): 4657.Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy. Web. 9 Feb. 2014.
20. Trakl, Georg. "Untergang - German Literature." Untergang. Trans. Richard Millington. Web. 18
Mar. 2014.

26

